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sufficient evidence indicating the existence of probable cause: the
traffic infractions; the officers' observation of the vials in the
bags; the police training in narcotics enabling them to deduce that
the vials were not for personal use; and the defendants' responses
and conduct during the routine traffic stop. 183 Without more, the
court concluded that the probable cause for the "warrantless
searches and seizures did not transgress the Federal or State
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
84
seizures." 1
The United States and New York State Constitutions both
prohibit warrantless searches. However, this rule does not extend
to searches of cars where a police officer has probable cause for
an arrest. Under the Federal and New York Constitution, courts
have held that the search of a car and the seizure of drug
paraphernalia within it are reasonable so long as the police
officer has probable cause.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
185

People v. Laws
(decided February 28, 1995)
The People brought this action to appeal the grant by the
Supreme Court, Bronx County, of a motion to suppress physical
evidence and statements made by the defendant. 186 The People
alleged that, under both the United States 187 and New York State

183. Yancy, 86 N.Y.2d at 246, 654 N.E.2d at 1236, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
184. Id.
185. 208 A.D.2d 317, 623 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1995).
186. Id. at 319, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.., but upon probable cause .... " Id.
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Constitutions, 188 the trial court erred in holding (1) that the
defendant had standing to contest the warrantless search and
seizure; 189 (2) that the discovery of a gun was the fruit of an
illegal detention; 190 and (3) that the statements made by the
defendant were also fruits of the same illegal detention. 19 1
The Appellate Division, First Department, held that the
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy when
he placed an object in the back seat of the automobile; 192 that the
police search of the vehicle was valid even though the defendant
was being illegally detained at the time of the search; 193 and that
the inculpatory statement made by the defendant while he was
being illegally detained was required to be suppressed.194
Accordingly, the appellate division modified the lower court's
holding by reversing the grant of the defendant's motion to
suppress the physical evidence and affirmed the exclusion of
statements. 195
On June 3, 1992, Police Officers Byrne and Gallo "were
driving southbound on Third Avenue in the Bronx in an
unmarked police car.., when they observed a four-door
Sunbird sedan with Connecticut plates double parked on the
northbound side of the street." 19 6 While the defendant was
standing by the open rear passenger side door, Officer Byrne saw
him "remove something from his waistband, lean over and place

188. Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, section 12 provides in
pertinent part that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
Id.
189. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 320, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
190. Id. at 322, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
191. Id. at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.

192. Id. at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
193. Id. at 322, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218-19.

194. Id. at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 319, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
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Officer Byrne made a

U-turn and noticed two female occupants inthe front seat after he
pulled up behind the car. 198 As the police stopped and got out of
their vehicle, the defendant shut the rear door and walked away
from the car. 199

The officers identified themselves to the defendant and while
Officer Gallow detained him, Officer Byrne approached the
car. 20 0 "On the floor of the rear compartment, he observed an
empty shoe box and a .9mm semi-automatic handgun." 2 0 1 When
Officer Byrne recovered the gun, the defendant admitted that it
202
was his and he was placed under arrest.

The trial court ordered the suppression of the gun and, without
any discussion, also ordered the suppression of the defendant's
statements. 20 3 In its decision to grant suppression, the court
found that the defendant had standing to contest a search of "'the

vehicle belonging to [his] partner.'

204

More precisely, the court

found that the defendant "could have been considered a licensee

with standing to contest a search of a car to which he had
access." 2 0 5 The court also found that the officers were not
entitled to stop the defendant as a result of seeing him "reach into

197. Id. Officer Byrne could not identify the object. Instead, he relied "on
his extensive experience" as an officer and "the defendant's movements"
which lead him to believe it was a gun. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 320, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 217. At first, the defendant said that he
would "take the weight" for the gun. Id. The defendant admitted that he owned
the gun after Officer Byrne explained to him that "if the gun was not his, he
should not take the responsibility for it." Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citations omitted). The defendant called two witnesses. Id. Ms.
Gallo, a Mr. Softee ice cream vendor and friend of the defendant, testified that
she had occasionally worked with the defendant. Id. The other witness testified
that the defendant was speaking to his brother on the sidewalk when the
officers approached him. Id.
205. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 57

1996]

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1139

his waistband, bend over a car, close the door and walk away"
and "that the officers acted on a mere hunch." 206

The appellate division first addressed the People's claim that
the defendant lacked standing to contest the warrentless search
and seizure. 207 The People argued that the defendant did not
possess an expectation of privacy in the car when he placed the
gun in the rear passenger compartment and since he lacked the

requisite expectation of privacy, he could not object to the
208
seizure of the gun.

The court began its analysis by noting that "[s]tanding to
challenge a search on constitutional grounds is no longer, as was
the holding of Jones v. United States,20 9 automatic, arising
merely... as a function of a person's legitimate presence in
premises where a search occurs." 2 10 The United States Supreme
Court has:

206. Id.
207z Id. at 320, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
208. Id. at 320-21, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
209. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980).
210. Lavs, 208 A.D.2d at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218 (citing Jones, 362 U.S.
at 267). In Jones, the United States Supreme Court expressed the nature of the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment in terms of privacy, noting that
the Fourth Amendment was not limited to excluding unreliable or prejudicial
evidence. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261. "[lIt is entirely proper to require of one
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search [to] establish that he himself
was the victim of an invasion of privacy." Id. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978) (holding that persons who fail to show a legitimate
expectation of privacy in an area searched or property seized, or have not
demonstrated either a property or possessory interest in the same area searched
or property seized, do not have standing to challenge the search); People v.
Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 162, 505 N.E.2d 586, 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77
(1987) (holding that when a defendant has no reasonable or constitutionally
recognizable expectation of privacy, the defendant has no standing to seek
suppression of evidence seized in a warrentless search). The Lawts court also
stated that the "right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal one." Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218. See
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (holding that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights [that] may not be vicariously asserted");
People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 429 N.E.2d 735, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
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defined the scope of the interest protected by the Fourth

Amendment as a legitimate expectation of privacy, one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In interpreting the
New York State Constitution, the Court of Appeals has

held... that New York provides no broader standing rule than
that allowed under the federal constitutional standard. 2 11

In People v. Rodriquez,2 12 the New York Court of Appeals

conducted an analysis concerning the invocation of the right to be
secure against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.
"Historically," the court noted, "to challenge the legality of a
search, the defendant had to show some possessory or proprietary
interest in the property seized or the area searched." 2 13 Some
years later, the United States Supreme Court announced that
anyone "legitimately on [the] premises has standing to challenge
the legality of the search." 2 14 Finally, in Rakas v. Illinois,2 15 the
Court refined this analysis to make the "legitimate expectation of
privacy" test the initial inquiry used to determine whether a
defendant has standing to object to a search or seizure. 2 16 Thus,
the proper inquiry into whether or not a person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy "should consider such factors as whether
the person took precautions to maintain privacy, the manner in
which he or she used the premises and whether he or she had the
211. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218. See Rakas, 439 U.S.
at 143-44; Rodriquez, 69 N.Y.2d at 162, 505 N.E.2d at 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
77. The Rodriquez court stated that the New York State Constitution was
sufficient and that "there was no reason to apply a more generous standing rule
than was allowed under the Federal constitutional standard." Id.
212. 69 N.Y.2d 159, 505 N.E.2d 586, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1987).
213. Id. at 162, 505 N.E.2d at 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 77. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that information from the
defendant's telephone conversations obtained through a wire tap did not
constitute a search or seizure), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
214. Rodriquez, 69 N.Y.2d at 162, 505 N.E.2d at 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
77. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), overruled by United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
215. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
216. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Rodriquez, 69 N.Y.2d at 162, 505 N.E.2d at
588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
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right to exclude other persons from the premises or the property
2 17

searched."
Applying these principles, the appellate division determined

that the defendant did not demonstrate a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the car. 2 18 The court conducted a thorough analysis of
the facts in reaching this decision. First and foremost, the court
noted that the defendant was not the owner of the car.2 19 The
only evidence presented at trial which pointed to the defendant
having any connection with the car was the testimony of a
witness, Mrs. Gallo, who claimed that she and the defendant
"were partners in [an] ice cream truck route." 2 20 The court,

relying on People v. Ortiz2 21 and People v. Herrin,222

determined that such a business relationship would not, in and of
itself, confer standing with respect to Ms. Gallo's car.223 There
was no evidence presented that the car was used for business
purposes, nor was there an argument that the defendant had
permission to use the car. 224 The court concluded that, since the
217. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218 (citing Rodriquez, 69
N.Y.2d at 162, 505 N.E.2d at 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 77).
218. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 321, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 83 N.Y.2d 840, 633 N.E.2d 1104, 611 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1994). In
Ortiz, the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant did not have
standing to challenge the entry into the apartment of his girlfriend without a
warrant. Id. at 842, 633 N.E.2d at 1105, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 501. According to
the court, a person may have an expectation of privacy in premises that are not
his, e.g., an overnight guest or a familial or other substantial relationship
recognized by society. Id. However, the court in Ortiz concluded that the
defendant was just a casual visitor in his girlfriend's apartment and lacked any
reasonable expectation of privacy in her apartment. Id. at 843, 633 N.E.2d at
1105, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
222. 187 A.D.2d 670, 590 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't 1992). In Herrin, the
defendant, and an accomplice who lived in the same house as the defendant,
were charged and convicted of robbery. Id. at 670, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 524. The
appellate division concluded that the defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in either his accomplice's bedroom or the car used during the
robberies and, therefore, lacked standing to object to the seizure of the items
found. Id. at 671, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25.
223. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 321-22, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
224. Id.
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defendant failed to establish any connection between himself and
the car in which the gun was discovered, he lacked standing to
225
object to the seizure of the gun.
The second claim made by the People was that the trial court
erred in holding that the discovery of the gun was the fruit of an
illegal detention. 226 The People argued, and the appellate
division agreed, that the defendant was not entitled to suppression
of the gun on the grounds that its recovery was not tainted by the
brief detention of the defendant because its recovery was
227
"derived from a source independent of the detention.",
The court determined that the gun was not the "fruit of an
illegal detention." 2 28 The appellate division relied on People v.

Rogers229 and People v. Pleasant230 in reaching
determination. In Rogers, the court of appeals held that:

this

225. Id. at 322, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
226. Id.
227. Id. The court stated that Officer Byrne's observation did not give rise
to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
Id. See People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184-85, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205-06,
581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620-21 (1992). The New York Court of Appeals in
Hollman relied on People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976), where the court set out "a four-tiered method for
evaluating the propriety of encounters initiated by police officers in their
criminal law enforcement capacity." Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 184, 590 N.E.2d
at 205, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620. The court stated that:
If a police officer seeks simply to request information from an
individual, that request must be supported by an objective, credible
reason, not necessarily indicative of criminal activity. The common-law
right of inquiry, a wholly separate level of contact, is "activated by a
founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat
greater intrusion." Where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that
a particular person was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, the officer
is authorized to forcibly stop and detain that person.
Id. at 184-85, 590 N.E.2d at 205-06, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21 (citing De Bour,
40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85).
228. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 322, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
229. 52 N.Y.2d 527, 421 N.E.2d 491, 439 N.Y.S.2d 96, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 898 (1981).
230. 76 A.D.2d 244, 430 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1980), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 924 (1982). The court in Pleasantstated that it is clear that not:
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the exclusionary rule is not automatic, and will not be applied if
the impact of the illegal arrest does not closely touch upon the
challenged evidence .... [A]t some point the chain of causation
leading from the illegal activity to the challenged evidence may
become so attenuated that the 'taint' of the original illegality is
2 31
removed.
"The stop of the defendant in no way aided Officer Byrne in
either the discovery or the recovery of the gun."232 Nor did the
defendant provide the officers with any information that led to
the whereabouts of the gun.2 3 3 The court stated that the brief
detention of the defendant was "intended merely to hold him 'and

not to provide the police with an opportunity to discover evidence
which was not otherwise available."

2 34

Furthermore, the court noted that "the gun's recovery was the
product of the plain view doctrine."235 As the New York Court
23 6
of Appeals pointed out in People v. Diaz:
all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is whether ... the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by... means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Id. at 246, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
231. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d at 532-33, 421 N.E.2d at 493, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 98
(citations omitted).
Situations in which the detrimental impact of the illegal actions by the
police [become so removed as to no longer justify the suppression of the
evidence] have been commonly grouped by the United States Supreme
Court [into separate categories. One of the categories is] where the
evidence challenged is the product of a source independent of the
defendant's detention ....
Id. (citing Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (emphasis added)).
232. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 322, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219. According to the
court, the gun would have been discovered even if the defendant had not been
detained because it was observed on the floor of the rear passenger
compartment by Officer Byrne when he walked over to the car. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citation omitted).
235. Id.
236. 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993).
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under the plain view doctrine, if the sight of an object gives the
police probable cause to believe that it is the instrumentality of a
crime, the object may be seized without a warrant if three
conditions are met: "(1) the police are lawfully in a position from
which the object can be viewed; (2) if the police have lawful
access to the object [in question]; and (3) the objects
237
incriminating nature is immediately apparent."

As the record shows in Laws, Officer Byrne lawfully
approached the car without entering it or even opening a door,
looked through a window and in plain view, observed a gun on
the floor of the rear passenger compartment. 2 3 8 "One has no

legitimate expectation of privacy in locations in a car which are
observable by passersby. Accordingly, an officer's simply
peering inside an automobile does not constitute a search and the

Fourth Amendment... does not limit this activity."' 239 Officer
Byrne could, by viewing the gun and given the exigency, i.e., its
location in plain view inside the car, seize it without a

237. Id. at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (citation
omitted). The Diaz court further stated that:
The plain view doctrine, it must be emphasized, establishes an exception
to the requirement of a warrant not to search for an item, but to seize it.
Because the item is already in the open where it may be seen, the owner
can have no expectation of privacy in its concealment and, thus, its
viewing cannot be a search under Article I, § 12 [of the New York State
Constitution] or the Fourth Amendment [of the United States
Constitution.]
Id.
238. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
239. People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 494-95, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1011, 483
N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (1984). See also People v. Manganaro, 176 A.D.2d 354,
574 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1991). In Manganaro,the appellate division held
that an officer's conduct in walking around a parked car and looking through
one of its windows did not constitute a search for which justification was
required. Id. at 355, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 588. The United States Supreme Court
has held that a motorist in such a case has "no legitimate expectation of
privacy in shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be
viewed from outside the vehicle by either an inquisitive passerby or diligent
police officers." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (quotations
omitted).
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warrant. 240 Thus, according to the court, the gun was improperly
suppressed. 24 1
The final claim made by the People was that the trial court
erred in determining that the statements made by the defendant
were also fruits of the same illegal detention. 242 In Rogers, the
court noted that "it is generally recognized that statements
derived from an illegal detention will be suppressed and cannot
be used at trial." 243 In People v. Hunt,244 the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, held that the
[d]efendant's statements to the police flowed directly from the
illegal arrest and it cannot be said that they were the product of a
source that was independent of the detention or that the illegal
activity was attenuated by some intervening event that justifies
the conclusion that the evidence was not a result of the illegal
5
arrest. 24
The court in Laws determined that the defendant's statements that
he would "take the weight for the gun" and that he "owned the
gun" were made while he was being detained and while the gun
was being recovered. 246 Following the rationale from Hunt, the
Laws court concluded that "[s]ince it cannot not be said that the
statements were 'the product of a source independent of the
defendant's detention' or that the illegal detention was
sufficiently attenuated so as to render the statements admissible,
these statements must be suppressed as the fruit of the illegal
detention."247
The federal and state courts have given law enforcement great
latitude in order to effectively carry out their respective anticrime goals. The United States and New York State Constitutions
prescribe that a person is protected against unreasonable searches
240. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527, 532, 421 N.E.2d 491, 493, 439

N.Y.S.2d 96, 98, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
244. 155 A.D.2d 957, 547 N.Y.S.2d 968 (4th Dep't 1989).
245. Id. at 959, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
246. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.

247. Id. (citations omitted).
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and seizures. However, under both the Federal and New York
State constitutions, "when a defendant has no reasonable or
constitutionally recognizable expectation of privacy, he has no
standing to seek suppression of evidence seized in a warrentless
search.,, 248 Additionally, the plain view doctrine, under both the
Federal and New York State Constitutions, permits the seizure of
an object if that object is viewed in plain sight from a lawful
vantage point, it is immediately apparent that the object is of an
incriminating nature, and the law enforcement official has some
249
lawful basis for being in a position in which it can be seized.
Finally, under both the Federal and New York State
Constitutions, "it is generally recognized that statements derived
from an illegal detention will be suppressed and cannot be used at
trial" 250 unless it is shown that the statements were the "product
of a source that [was) independent of [the] detention
or ... sufficiently attenuated so as to render the statements
25 1
admissible.",

248. People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 161, 505 N.E.2d 586, 588, 513

N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1987).
249. People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301, 595

N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (1993).
250. People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527, 532, 421 N.E.2d 491, 493, 439
N.Y.S.2d 96, 98, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981) (citations omitted).
251. Laws, 208 A.D.2d at 323, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
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